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Abstract
If only debtholders receive delayed information about the state of
a company, the credit spread on risky corporate debt is wider than if
both debt- and equityholders receive information with the same de-
lay. Information asymmetry leads to wider credit spreads than only
delayed, but symmetrically distributed, information. Incomplete, in
particular asymmetric and delayed, information’s impact on the pric-
ing of risky corporate debt is analyzed in a simpliﬁed version of the
seminal Du e and Lando (2001) model. Incomplete information is
costly in the sense that companies default earlier and credit spreads,
in most, but not all, cases widen, both compared to the case of full
information. Delayed, but symmetrically distributed information has,
for realistic parameter values, only a minor e↵ect on credit spreads
compared to the full information case.




We show that information asymmetry leads to wider credit spreads than only
delayed, but symmetrically distributed, information in most realistic cases.
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1Incomplete, in particular asymmetric and delayed, information’s impact on
the pricing of risky corporate debt is analyzed in a version of the seminal
Du e and Lando (2001) model. Du e and Lando (2001) use a more com-
plicated (and realistic) information structure than we do, including noisy
accounting information. As their model, our model is a structural model of
credit risk for which a default intensity exists, but we simplify their model
by not including noisy accounting information. We get qualitatively similar
results, suggesting that the presence of asymmetric information between two
groups of agents is the important property of a credit risk model if the ob-
jective is to obtain wider credit spreads on risky corporate debt than those
obtained from standard structural models of credit risk. In order to analyze
the e↵ect of delayed, either symmetrically or asymmetrically distributed in-
formation, we also analyze the case where even the better informed group
of agents receives delayed information. This situation leads to the presence
of a bankruptcy wild card, a non-negative cashﬂow (strictly positive if the
liquidation value of the company exceeds the sum of debt and bankruptcy
costs). This novel property of our model captures the fact that even the
better informed group of agents, the equityholders, must make the default
decision based on incomplete information. The presence of the bankruptcy
wild card tends to accelerate the default decision. However, only in situ-
ations with extraordinary long information delays and/or high volatilities
are credit spreads on risky corporate debt wider, compared to the situation
when equityholders have complete information.
Incomplete information is costly in the sense that companies default
earlier and credit spreads in most, but not all, cases widen. From our model
we learn that the major cause of this widening is asymmetric information
between two groups of agents, and not the delay in the information per se.
Our model contains two distinct types of agents; bond- and equityhold-
ers.1 The two types of agents are grouped into one or two groups. A group is
characterized by the information available to the agents in the group. Equi-
tyholders are always included in the better informed group. Incompleteness
of information is caused by delayed observations of the state variable. The
better informed group observes the state variable with shorter delay than
the less infomed group. We calculate the optimal bankruptcy barrier in the
presence of the bankruptcy wild card. To highlight the insights of the model,
we analyze the following four cases:
• Case 1: The complete information case, cf. Leland (1994), our bench-
mark case, where all agents are perfectly informed.
• Case 2: The general case where both bond- and equityholders have
incomplete information, but equityholders are better informed than
bondholders.
1For future research we propose in section 5 to include a third group (management).
2• Case 3: Equityholders have perfect information, bondholders have ac-
ces to delayed information only, cf. Du e and Lando (2001).
• Case 4: All agents have access to the same delayed information.
Our paper is also related to Giesecke (2006). He analyzes two classes of
models of imperfect information: 1) Models where the bankruptcy barrier
is not observable to all agents (see also Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) for
more on this). 2) Models with incomplete information about the value of
the company’s assets. Our model belongs to his category 2). From his
results (Proposition 6.4) we know that a default intensity exists for our
model. His results in the case where agents do not have any information
about the state variable, may be seen as a special case of our model where
agents have access to delayed information. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and
Helwege (2003) calculate the default intensity explicitly in a similar model,
analyzing somewhat di↵erent issues.
Credit risk is a topic that has received attention in both the academic
literature and among practitioners. There are two dominating approaches to
credit risk modelling in the ﬁnance literature; structural models and reduced
form models. The ﬁrst was pioneered by Merton (1974). Merton models
the value of a company’s assets by a stochastic process and debt and equity
are considered as contingent claims on total asset value. Some of the pa-
pers in this tradition include Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Longsta↵
and Schwartz (1995), Leland (1994), and Du e and Lando (2001). The
second approach assumes the existence of a default arrival intensity. This
approach was pioneered by Jarrow and Turnbull (1992), for extensions see
e.g., Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997), and
Sch¨ onbucher (1998).2 Coculescu, Geman, and Jeanblanc (2008) and Guo,
Jarrow, and Zeng (2008) analyze technical aspects of credit risk and in-
complete information. Giesecke (2006) and Giesecke and Goldberg (2004)
analyze how di↵erent information sets in structural models a↵ect default
arrival intensities.
Jarrow and Protter (2004) argue that the essential di↵erence between
structural and reduced form models is the assumption regarding which in-
formation that is available to the modeler. In their terminology, a model is
structural if the modeler can observe the state of the company and reduced
form if not. They write (page 2): “...there appears to be no disagreement
that the asset value process is unobservable by the market... Although not
well understood in terms of its implications, this consensus supports the
usage of reduced form models.” In our set-up we ﬁnd that it is not the in-
completeness of information about the asset value process that is important
2Comprehensive treatments of these two approaches can be found in the enclopedic
monograph by Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002) or in the more accessible monograph by
Du e and Singleton (2003).
3for pricing of credit risk. If di↵erent groups of agents have access to the same
incomplete information about the process, the error made by using a struc-
tural model, compared to a reduced form model, interpreted as in Jarrow
and Protter (2004), is negligible. The important factor is any information
asymmetry between the agents in the credit market (bondholders) and the
agents operating the company (equityholders).
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present our economic
model. In section 3 we analyze the optimal default barrier and credit risk
valuation. Special cases with numerical examples are presented and analyzed
in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper and gives suggestions for future
reserach.
2 Economic Model
This section presents our model of a company with incomplete secondary
market information about the credit quality of its debt. In particular, we
show how incomplete information a↵ects the valuation of debt in secondary
markets. Therefore, we do not address whether debt is issued in an optimal
way, i.e., whether the capital structure of the issuer is optimal or not. Our
model is standard, and we follow closely the set-up by Du e and Lando
(2001).
We assume that the only state variable is the stock of assets. It is given
as the solution to the stochastic di↵erential equation
dVt = µVtdt +  VtdBt, (1)
where µ and   are constants. We assume that µ<r ,w h e r er is the constant
risk free interest rate, and that its time 0 value, V0, is a given constant. Here,
the process B = {Bt}t 0 is a standard Brownian motion deﬁned on a ﬁxed,
ﬁltered probability space (⌦,F,P). The process V = {Vt}t 0 is known
as a geometric Brownian motion and Vt is log-normally distributed. Also,
P represents the original probability measure. All agents in the economy
are assumed risk neutral. The information ﬁltration Ft is generated by the
process {Vs,0 s  t} (augmented with all sets of measure zero).
To incorporate asymmetric information, we assume that two distinct
groups of agents are completely characterized by their information ﬁltra-
tions Fm
t and Fl
t,r e s p e c t i v e l y .S u p e r s c r i p t sm and l signify more and less
information. We deﬁne
Fm
t = Ft m, for all t   m,
Fl
t = Ft l, for all t   l,





4Thus, in the case m>0, also the better informed agents have incomplete
information about the state variable, whereas in the case m = 0, the better
informed agents have complete information. We interpret m as a measure of
information delay and l  m as a measure of information asymmetry in the
remainder of the paper. Thus, information delay refers to information avail-
able to the better informed agent, whereas information asymmetry refers to
the di↵erence in the information available to the two groups of agents.
At time t the asset process generates a dividend  Vt m, for some constant
  > 0, to the equityholders. Observe that the dividend payment at time t is
determined by the delayed value Vt m of the asset process.
The time t present value of all future dividends, ˆ V m














Observe that the present value ˆ V m
t is just a multiple of Vt m, either one of
these quantities could therefore be used as the state variable. We assume
that the dividends are not observable for the less informed group of agents,
otherwise they could calculate the better informed group’s assessed value of
the company, and, thus, eliminate the information asymmetry. The quantity
ˆ V m
t is sometimes called the unlevered value of the company.
As in Leland (1994), we assume that the company has issued perpetual
debt with face value D. The debt is serviced by a constant rate of coupon
payments C. These payments are tax deductible (only interest is paid on
perpetual debt). The tax beneﬁt rate is ✓C,w h e r e✓ is the tax rate.
We deﬁne the stopping time ⌧ with respect to the ﬁltration Fm
t for ﬁxed
t   m as
⌧ =i n f {u   t : Vu m  Wm}, (3)
where Wm is Fm
t -measurable (i.e., a constant for agents with information
given by Fm
t ). In this model, the company is bankrupt and liquidated the
ﬁrst time Vt m = Wm,i . e . ,⌧ represents the time of bankruptcy. In the
special case where m = 0, we denote W0 by W. At the time of bankruptcy,
the value of the company is immediately revealed and publicly available,




i.e., as the unlevered value of the company given full information at the
time of bankruptcy. This value does not take any e↵ects of possibly opti-
mally restructured debt at bankruptcy into account. Furthermore, at the
time of bankruptcy, a bankruptcy cost ↵  V⌧
r µ, ↵ 2 [0,1], proportional to the
liquidation value of the company occurs.
In addition to the information contained in Fl
t, the less informed agents
also observe whether the company is bankrupt or not. Formally, we deﬁne
5the information available to the less informed agents as
Gl
t = Fl
t _  (1{⌧>s},s t),
where 1{·} denotes the usual indicator function.
The better informed agents are restricted from trading in the ﬁnancial
market, and the market therefore only consists of the less informed agents.
Thus, market prices of credit risky instruments are set by the less informed
agents. In this paper we assume that equityholders belong to the better
informed group. The bondholders belong to the better informed group in
the case of symmetric information and to the less informed group in the case
of asymmetrric information.
3 Optimal Default Barrier and Credit Risk Valu-
ation
3.1 Bankruptcy Wild Card
The decision to ﬁle for bankruptcy is taken by the better informed agents,
i.e., by equityholders. Due to the delay m, there is a positive probability
that the full information value of the stock of assets, V⌧, is larger than
the delayed value of the stock of assets, V⌧ m, on which the bankruptcy
decision is made. From standard properties of geometric Brownian motions,
the complete-information value of the stock of assets at the bankruptcy time
⌧ is given by
V⌧ = V⌧ me(µ  1
2 2)m+ (B⌧ B⌧ m) (4)
and is also log-normally distributed. Using the deﬁnition of the barrier Wm
in expression (3), the time ⌧ value of the stock of assets can also be written
as
V⌧ = Wme(µ  1
2 2)m+ (B⌧ B⌧ m).
In case of bankruptcy, the debtholders, according to absolute priority,
require the face value of the debt D. As explained above, a positive delay
m has the consequence that  V⌧
r µ   ↵  V⌧
r µ   D>0 with positive probability.
In this case, the time ⌧ liquidation value of the company is more than
su cient to cover debt and bankruptcy costs, and any proceeds are paid
to the equityholders. By deciding to ﬁle for bankruptcy at time ⌧,t h e
equityholders get a bankruptcy wild card3 with payo↵ (
 (1 ↵)
r µ V⌧   D)+.
3This wild card has some resemblance to the wild card play that is present when trading
the CBOT Treasury bond futures, see e.g., Hull (2006, pp. 135-136).

























and N(·) is the cumulative standard normal probability distribution func-
tion.
Proof. The result follows from the standard Black-Scholes-Merton formula
for a European call option, but without discounting because the payo↵ is
received instantaneously at the time of bankruptcy, i.e., when V⌧ m = Wm.
3.2 Optimal Default Barrier
Equityholders maximize the value of their investment by determining when
to default on the loan payments. Default is declared the ﬁrst time Vt m =
Wm.A tt i m et they face the optimal stopping problem










The ﬁrst term inside the integral at the right hand side in expression (6)
is the discounted value of the dividends net of after-tax coupon payments.
The second term is the present value of the bankruptcy wild card. There are
three di↵erences between the optimization problem in expression (6) and the
standard complete information optimization problem, see e.g., Du e (2001),
chapter 11.C. The ﬁrst is the inclusion of the bankruptcy wild card in the
optimization problem. Second, the lagged state variable Vt m enters, and
third, the information set at time t is lagged.
We now use the results of Øksendal (2004) to transform the optimal
stopping problem with delayed information into an optimal stopping prob-
lem with non-delayed information. To this end observe that expression (6)
can be written as












7where the stopping time ⌧⇤ = ⌧   m and T ⇤ is the set of all Ft m-adapted
stopping times. We recognize expression (7) as a standard optimal stop-
ping problem and its connection to ordinary di↵erential equations (ODEs)
is known.




 2v2 vv   r  +( r   µ)v   (1   ✓)=0 , (8)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The general solution to this
equation is













with  1 < 0 and  2   1. Di↵erentiating   with respect to v yields
 v =  1A1v 1 1 +  2A2v 2 1 +1 .
When the value of the company approaches inﬁnity, only equityholders ben-
eﬁt from a marginal increase in asset value, thus
lim
v!1
 v =1 . (9)
As  2   1, condition (9) implies that A2 = 0, i.e.,











Equations (11) and (12) can be solved for A1 and Wm. Note in particular
that Wm also can be determined by bondholders, i.e., Wm is Fl
t-measurable,
i.e., a constant for all agents in our model.
83.2.1 A closed form solution for equations (11) and (12)
In this subsection we express the company’s debt D as a multiple   of the
default barrier Wm,i . e . ,D =  Wm, for a constant   > 0. Any relationship
between Wm and D can be expressed in this manner, so our approach is
without any loss of generality (although it may be somewhat unfamiliar to
think of the face value of debt as a multiple of the optimal default barrier).
























By the assumed parametrization of D, z does not depend on Wm and ⇡(Wm)
is, thus, linear in Wm.






Q ⌘  N(z    
p
m).
We can then write
⇡(Wm)=Wm(K   Q).
By using this notation, equation (12) can be written as
 v(Wm)=K. (14)













Observe that in cases where the bankruptcy wild card has no value, i.e.,















 1 1Q. The right hand side of the above equation is
a hyperbolic function of the delay m. There exists an asymptotic value of
m where Wm is not well deﬁned. For values of m below this asymptote,
Wm is positive and increasing. Realistic values of m is below the asymptote
for reasonable parameter values. In general, for ⇡(Wm) > 0, implying that
K>Q ,t h u s ,K>
 1
 1 1Q , the bankruptcy barrier Wm is higher than in the
case without a bankruptcy wild card. Thus, the existence of a bankruptcy
wild card leads to earlier default compared to the case with no bankruptcy
wild card.
In expression (15) we establish that imperfect information leads to ear-
lier defaults than under perfect information. The value of equity can be
thought of as the value of a real option the equityholders hold to continue
servicing the loan payments and thereby receiving dividend payments. De-
layed information reduces the value of this real option and equityholders
will therefore pay less to keep the option alive, i.e., they increase the default
barrier and therefore default earlier. Exercising the bankruptcy wild card
is an alternative for the equityholders to continue operating the company.
As the alternative becomes more lucrative, i.e., its value increases, running
the company becomes relatively less rewarding and the equityholders will
ﬁle for bankruptcy earlier.
3.3 Credit Risk Valuation
The only credit sensitive asset of the company is a bank loan. The bank
belongs to the less informed group of agents and assesses the fair terms of
the loan. The bank securitizes the loan into a continuum of zero coupon
bonds, where the continuum is with respect to the time to maturity. Du e
and Lando (2001) explain the connection between perpetual debt and unit
discount bonds. Throughout the paper we analyze one of these zero coupon
bonds. The bond matures at time s, with recovery function R(⌧,s)i nt h e
case of default at time ⌧ <s . The price of the bond consists of two parts: 1)
The discounted value of the principal paid at maturity and 2) the discounted
value of the recovery payment in case of default. More formally, the time t
price of a bond maturing at time s is the conditional expected discounted
















In the second equality, we have used the recovery function R(u,s)=( 1 
↵)e r(s u), u 2 (t,s], i.e., the same recovery function as in Du e and Lando
(2001). This recovery function is used throughout the paper.
For a credit risky zero-coupon bond, the credit spread ⌘l,m is deﬁned as
the excess yield compared to the yield on a riskfree zero-coupon bond. From



















Notice that the credit spread vanishes as ↵ ! 0. Furthermore, the credit




Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003) ﬁnd that since 1937 only four companies
have defaulted on bonds with an investment grade rating from Moody’s.
This empirical observation suggests that the information asymmetry l   m
cannot be too large. With a su ciently large information asymmetry, even
a company issuing bonds rated investment grade may have time to move
into default.4
4 Special Cases and Numerical Examples
In this section we look at the four special cases from the introduction and
provide some numerical examples. We start with the simplest case of all, i.e.,
the base-case with complete information, i.e., no information asymmetry,
l m = 0, and no information delay, m = 0. This case serves as a benchmark
case. We then look at the most general case with information asymmetry,
l   m>0, and information delay, m>0. We end this section by looking
at the cases with 1) information asymmetry, but no information delay, l  
m>0, m = 0, and 2) no information asymmetry, but information delay,
l   m = 0, m>0. The numerical examples in this section are based on the
parameter values in table 1.
In the 12 year period from 1995-2007 the average recovery rate for se-
nior secured loans in the US was 72.3%, while the corresponding recovery
rate for high yield bonds was 42.2%, cf. Altman, Resti, and Sironi (2004).
Our model does not include an exogenously speciﬁed recovery rate param-
eter. Instead, the use of a bankruptcy cost parameter ↵ induces di↵erent
(expected) recovery rates, depending on the numerical values of the other
parameters that are used. A tax rate of 30% seems reasonable for many
companies. A volatility of 30% means that the instantaneous standard de-
viation of the return on the stock of assets is 30%. Some of the parameters
are altered in the numerical examples.
4This observation also gives some justiﬁcation for using a di↵usion model instead of
a jump-di↵usion model. Few companies “jump” into default when their bonds are rated
investment grade. However, it should be pointed out that many bonds jump several
categories down to junk rating from investment grade and default shortly thereafter. This
happened to Enron who defaulted from a junk rating, but who was rated investment grade
two days before it defaulted.
11Table 1: Base-case parameters.
V0 100 initial value of stock of assets
  0.035 fraction of stock of assets paid as dividend
r 0.08 riskfree interest rate
µ 0.045 growth rate of stock of assets
  0.3 volatility of stock of assets
✓ 0.3 tax rate
↵ 0.5 bakruptcy cost parameter
C 13 coupon payment
  90
65 ratio between debt and bankruptcy barrier
4.1 The Base-case (l   m =0 ,m=0 )
In this case there is neither information asymmetry, nor information delay,
both bond- and equityholders have perfect information. Thus, Gl
t = Fm
t =
Ft.I fµ = r and   = 0, this case corresponds to the model by Leland (1994).
Also, with r>µand   > 0, this is a well-known case and serves well as
a benchmark case when delayed information is included in the subsequent
subsections.
Equityholders are faced with the same optimal stopping problem as
in equation (6), but the bankruptcy wild card is not present (it has zero
value). The value matching and the high contact conditions therefore be-
come  (W) = 0 and  v(W) = 0. The solution for W is given in expression
(16)5 . For the base-case parameter values, W = 65.
Bond prices are calculated by expression (17) with l = 0. Thus,
'(t,s)=P(⌧ >s
 
 Ft)= (s   t,ln(W/Vt)),
where an analytical expression for  (·,·) is given in expression (22) in ap-
pendix A.
In ﬁgure 1 we plot the credit spreads bondholders require for bonds
with maturities between 0 and 3 years for three di↵erent levels of the tax
rate ✓: 20%, 30%, and 40%. The widest credit spreads are required for
the lowest tax rate and the tightest spreads for the highest tax rate. The
explanation for this observation is that, ceteris paribus, lending money is
less risky when the tax rate is high because the value of the tax-shield from
interest payments is worth more to equityholders and they will therefore
wait longer, i.e., accept lower dividend payments before they default on
their loan payments. The survival probability is increasing in the tax rate.
Observe how the credit spreads vanish as the time to maturity ap-
proaches zero, a typical feature of structural models of credit risk, but it
5In the special case considered by Leland (1994) where µ = r, W =( 1  ✓)C/(r+0.5 
2).
12Figure 1: Credit spreads base case The ﬁgure shows credit spreads for
zero-coupon bonds with up to three years to maturity. The tax rates ✓ are
20% (widest spreads), 30%, and 40% (tightest spreads).
contradicts empirical observations in credit markets.
4.2 The General Case (l   m>0,m>0)
We now assume that both information asymmetry and information delay are
present. I.e., both groups of agents have incomplete information about the
value of the state variable, and the information is asymmetrically distributed
between the two groups. More formally, Gl
t ⇢ Fm
t ⇢ Ft.
The bankruptcy barrier is not a function of the current value of the
state variable. Thus, even though equityholders are better informed than
bondholders, also bondholders can determine Wm. Denote the minimum
value of the process Vt over a period [u,v]b yMu,v,i . e . ,
Mu,v =m i n {Vt;u  t  v}.









13Figure 2: Credit spreads general case The ﬁgure shows credit spreads
for zero-coupon bonds with up to three years to maturity. The information
delays m are 0.1 (widest spreads), 0.2, and 0.3 (tightest spreads). The lower,
dotted line represents the complete information case.















 (s   m   (t   l),ln(Wm/Vt l))
 (l   m,ln(Wm/Vt l))
, (20)
where the expression for  (·,·) is given in expression (22) in appendix A.
Assume the same parameter values as in table 1. In addition, l =0 .4.
Figure 2 shows the credit spreads for m =0 .1 (widest spreads), m =0 .2,
and m =0 .3 (tightest spreads with solid line, the dotted line represents the
complete information case (base-case)). Note in particular how asymmetric
information leads to wider credit spreads for short-term bonds.
It may at ﬁrst seem counter intuitive that the spreads decrease as eq-
uityholders become less informed (m increases). However, recall that the
degree of asymmetric information between bond- and equityholders, l   m,
decreases as m increases. Thus, the decrease in credit spreads is a result of
a decreased degree of asymmetric information.
14(a) The optimal default barrier W
m as a
function of m and   for ↵ =0 .5.
(b) The optimal default barrier W
m as a
function of m and   for ↵ =0 .3.
(c) The value of the bankruptcy wild card
⇡(m) as a function of m and   for ↵ =0 .5.
(d) The value of the bankruptcy wild card
⇡(m) as a function of m and   for ↵ =0 .3.
Figure 3: E↵ects on the optimal default barrier Wm and the value of the
bankruptcy wild card ⇡(m) for di↵erent levels of information delay m and
volatiliy  , for two di↵erent levels of the bankruptcy parameter ↵.
The optimal default barrier is relatively insensitive to which degree the
information is delayed. The obvious explanation for this observation is that
even for long delays, the value of the bankruptcy wild card is modest.
From ﬁgure 3, part (a) and (b), we see that even a delay of one year
has only a negligible e↵ect on the optimal default barrier Wm. The graph is
increasing in volatility, but rather ﬂat in the delay (in particular for ↵ =0 .3),
suggesting that the delay has only low inﬂuence on the optimal default
barrier.
The value of the bankruptcy wild card is decreasing in the bankruptcy
cost parameter ↵, cf. ﬁgure 3 part (c) and (d). The delay is therefore more
15important for the optimal default barrier when bankruptcy costs are low
than when they are high. The probability that the bankruptcy wild card
matures in-the-money decreases in ↵.
The bankruptcy wild card is a type of call option and its value is therefore
non-decreasing in volatility. Figure 3 illustrates the e↵ect of volatility on the
default barrier and on the value of the bankruptcy wild card. A higher ↵
means that the wild card is more out-of-the-money and therefore has a lower
value.
4.3 Du e-Lando (l   m>0,m=0 )
In this case there is information asymmetry, but no information delay. Sim-
ilar to the model by Du e and Lando (2001), the information structure is
as follows: Gl
t ⇢ Fm
t = Ft. As already mentioned, they use a richer and
more complicated information structure than we do here, but our simpliﬁed
information structure produces qualitatively similar results.
When no information delay is present, i.e, m = 0, the bankruptcy wild
card is not present and the default barrier is W, the same as in the case of
complete information, see subsection 4.1. The survival probability is, thus,
given in expression (20) with m = 0.
If we plot credit spreads for l =0 .1, l =0 .2, and l =0 .3 in this case,
using the base case parameters, we get a ﬁgure identical to ﬁgure 2. The
explanation is that the information asymmetry l   m is the same as in the
previous subsection, i.e., these values of l are the same as the the values of
l   m in previous subsection. In addition, the value of the bankruptcy wild
card is not signiﬁcant for the base case parameters. We show later that in
(extreme) cases where the delay m is su ciently long and/or the voltility is
extremely high, the optimal default barrier and credit spreads in the present
case and in the general case in subsection 4.2 di↵er.
4.4 Case of Symmetrically Delayed Information (l   m =
0,m>0)
The ﬁnal case we consider is with delayed information, but with no infor-
mation asymmetry. The information is symmetrically distributed between
bond- and equityholders, i.e., l = m,m > 0.
To price corporate bonds, bondholders also in this case make use of








t )= (s   t,ln(Wm/V m
t )). (21)
By comparing this expression with the corresponding expression for the case
of full information, the only way symmetric, but delayed information, can
a↵ect credit spreads is if the default barrier Wm di↵ers from W.
16In the ﬁgures 4 and 5, the credit spreads for the four cases are plotted.
For the base-case volatility and no information delay (m = 0) and asymmet-
ric information l   m =0 .2, part (a) of both ﬁgures show that the general
case coincides with the Du e-Lando case. The assumption of no informa-
tion delay m = 0 reduces the general model to the Du e-Lando model.
Similarily, considering symmetrically delayed information, i.e., m =0 .2 and
l   m = 0, the credit spreads coincide with the spreads in the complete
information case. Thus, asymmetry l   m is far more important for credit
spreads than a symmetric delay of information. In the Du e-Lando case,
the less informed agents observe the information with a delay of 0.2. In the
case with symmetrically delayed information, all agents observe the infor-
mation with a delay of 0.2. The case where only some of the agents observe
the information with a delay of 0.2 produces the wider credit spreads.
In panel (b) of the ﬁgures, the information asymmetry is doubled to
l m =0 .4. The increased information asymmetry widens the credit spreads,
in particular for bonds with short time to maturity.
We investigate two strategies to enhance the di↵erences between the
various cases; we increase the information delay and the volatility. In part
(c) of the ﬁgures, the information delay is increased to m = 2, maintaining
the same information asymmetry of l m =0 .2 as in part (a). This increase
creates wider credit spreads in the general case than in the Du e-Lando
case. Wider credit spreads are obtained from the case with symmetrically
delayed information compared to the complete information case. This e↵ect
is solely due to the changed optimal default barrier. Note that we have to
increase m to around 2 to visualize this e↵ect for ↵ =0 .5. For more realistic
values of m, say, below 1 year, this di↵erence is not visible.
In part (d) we apply moderate information delay and information asym-
metry (l   m =0 .5, m =0 .2), and more drastically increase the volatility
to   =1 .2. We see similar e↵ects as in part (c) of the ﬁgures. Also, note
that in this case we increase the volatility together with the delays to about
these levels (  =1 .2) to visually detect di↵erences between the two cases of
asymmetric and symmetric information (for ↵ =0 .5), respectively.
In the case of high volatility and low bankruptcy costs, see ﬁgure (5),
panel (c), we observe lower spreads in the asymmetric Du e-Lando case
than in the symmetrical delayed case even for relatively short times to ma-
turity. In this case the e↵ect on the spreads from the increased value of
the bankruptcy wild card (which is increasing in m and  ) dominates the
standard increasing e↵ect on the spread from asymmetric information.
Finally, comparing ﬁgures 4 and 5, we see that one e↵ect of a lower
bankruptcy cost is to tighten credit spreads, cf. the deﬁnition of credit
spreads in expression (18).
17(a) No information delay, moderate infor-
mation asymmetry,   =0 .3, l   m =0 .2,
m =0 .
(b) Moderate information delay, high in-
formation asymmetry,   =0 .3, l   m =
0.4, m =0 .2.
(c) Long information delay, moderate in-
formation asymmetry,   =0 .3, l   m =
0.2, m =2 .
(d) High volatility, moderate information
delay, moderate information asymmetry,
  =1 .2, l   m =0 .2, m =0 .2.
Figure 4: Examples of credit spreads for four the four cases for ↵ =0 .5
5 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
In this paper we propose a simple approach to include delayed and asym-
metric information between groups of agents in a secondary credit market.
We articulate the e↵ect of delayed information on shareholders’ endogenous
decision to default. In particular, we show that incomplete information
to equityholders about the true company value only has a small e↵ect on
their decision to default on the loan payments for realistic parameter values.
Any e↵ect is to accelerate a default. The decision to default is accelerated
because by defaulting, equityholders receive a bankruptcy wild card with
non-negative value. If both bond- and equityholders have access to the
same delayed information, the only reason for changed credit spreads is a
18(a) No information delay, moderate infor-
mation asymmetry,   =0 .3, l   m =0 .2,
m =0 .
(b) Moderate information delay, high in-
formation asymmetry,   =0 .3, l   m =
0.4, m =0 .2.
(c) Long information delay, moderate in-
formation asymmetry,   =0 .3, l   m =
0.2, m =2 .
(d) High volatility, moderate information
delay, moderate information asymmetry,
  =1 .2, l   m =0 .2, m =0 .2.
Figure 5: Examples of credit spreads for four the four cases for ↵ =0 .3
potential change in equityholders’ optimal default barrier, compared to the
complete information case. For realistic parameter values, these changes
are small. We further ﬁnd that asymmetric information between bond- and
equityholders is important for credit spreads, more important than delayed,
symmetrically distributed information. In most interesting cases, increased
information asymmetry leads to wider credit spreads. Our model produces
short-term credit spreads more in line with empirical observations than most
standard structural models of credit risk.
The results in this paper have empirical testable implications: Do compa-
nies where there is likely to be more asymmetric information between bond-
and equityholders pay higher interest rates on their loans? Do companies
where there is more uncertainty about asset values, i.e., a higher degree
19of incomplete information, default earlier than other companies? One in-
dication that may lead to a conﬁrmative answer to the last question is if
equityholders tend to receive payments from the bankruptcy wild card more
often than equityholders of companies with a lower degree of incomplete
information. Our model also predicts that companies with a high ↵, for
instance because of relatively illiquid assets, wait longer before they default.
A typical reason for illiquid assets is a high degree of asset speciﬁcity.
For future extensions of the results in this paper, we think it would be
interesting to include a third group of agents: management. Management
would always belong to the better informed group. With three groups of
agents, we could for instance assume that bond- and equityholders both
belong to the less informed group of agents. By this assumption one could
extend the analysis to also include companies whose equity is traded in the
ﬁnancial market. Unfortunately, this assumption makes the model hard
to solve. For the model to be consistent, the dividends paid at time t
would have to be  Vt u,w h e r eu  l. If the default barrier is based on
the information set of the management (Fm
t ), the connection between the
optimal stopping problem and the ODEs is, to the best of our knowledge,




Consider a geometric Brownian motion with dynamics as in expression (1)
with initial value v, and a barrier vb <v . Consider the arithmetic process
dXt =( µ    2)t +  Wt, starting at X0 = 0. The ﬁrst time the process Vt
hits vB is equivalent to the ﬁrst time the process Xt hits x =l n ( vB/v). The
probability for process Vt of not crossing the barrier vb in a time period of
length s is identical to the probability for process Xt of not crossing the
















where ⌫ = µ  1
2 2, see e.g., Musiela and Rutkowski (1997) Corollary B.3.4.
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